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Commentary and Reply
On “The Centurion Mindset and the Army’s
Strategic Leader Paradigm”
Allan R. Millett

This commentary is in response to Jason W. Warren’s article “The Centurion Mindset
and the Army’s Strategic Leader Paradigm” published in the Autumn 2015 issue of
Parameters (vol. 45, no. 3).

I

n Major Jason Warren’s thoughtful article on what he perceives as the
lack of strategic vision in today’s Army general officers, I found an
assertion that needs a bullet. Major Warren says the lack of combat
experience or even service in France in World War I deprived World War
II’s generals of an essential professional experience. The author’s precise
claim is clear enough: “In 1943 the majority of the Army’s ‘elite’ senior
leadership lacked combat experience prior to that conflict.” They had
missed the 1918 campaign in France.
Assuming that assertion is true, I still wonder why fighting a war at
the battalion level or below shapes fighting a war at the division, corps,
and army level. The calculations at the strategic level are considerably
different and shaped by factors far from battlefield operations.
If combat experience was so important for senior leadership, then
the United States was blessed, for its wartime army, 1941-1945, had a
wide number of officers in high command who had seen war at its worst
in 1918. Contrary to Major Warren’s claim of inexperience—a specious
claim advanced by British officers and newsmen—the wartime Army
of the United States had a majority of former AEF officers directing
America’s ground forces and filling the senior ranks of the USAAF.
Irritated once more by the erroneous claim about the lack of combat
experience, I made a cursory study of the careers of officers who might
qualify as “elite” Army leaders. I defined “elite” as officers in the rank of
general and lieutenant general who exercised command responsibilities
or high level staff billets at the War Department-Army Staff level and the
theater, army group, army, and corps level. In my pool of “elite” generals
I included major generals who commanded divisions and then moved to
corps or higher levels or staff positions at the theater, army group, and
army level. I have included some corps commanders who were relieved.
I believe my criteria for selection, data, and analysis are appropriate. My
numbers show that few of the Army’s elite missed World War I. Whether
that experience made them better World War II commanders is a question of a different order and has no statistical answer. I suspect it did
influence command styles, but had little or nothing to do with strategy.
The “elite” officers who missed service in the American
Expeditionary Forces or those forces sent to Italy and Russia are easy
to find. Certainly some can claim “elite” status as Army-influential
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leaders during and after World War II: Dwight D. Eisenhower, Omar
N. Bradley, Matthew B. Ridgway, H. H. Arnold, Jacob L. Devers, and J.
Lawton Collins. I would add Simon B. Buckner, Jr. (KIA on Okinawa),
Geoffrey Keyes, Lucian K. Truscott, Ernest J. Muller, and Ira B. Eaker.
Timing is everything. It is virtually impossible for anyone commissioned after June, 1918 to have been in France that fall. Most of the
AEF officers went into combat in May to November, 1918, not before.
Some “elite” officers, like James M. Gavin, were too young (at least
in the career sense) to have served in the AEF. Although I may have
excluded someone by not including them as “elite” or by not yet finding
biographical data, I think this list of non-combat veterans is complete
enough for initial, tentative analysis.
With a few exceptions I have counted only officers commissioned
in the cavalry, artillery, and infantry, though a few officers of coast artillery, the signal corps, and the Corps of Engineers found themselves
in combat. Officers of the Air Service came from many sources. The
dominant source for all generals was graduation from the US Military
Academy at West Point.
Second, in compiling a list of AEF veterans who became “elite”
Army officers in World War II, I included not just senior commanders,
but officers who held senior staff positions at the theater, army group,
and army level. I did not include corps or division staff officers. Almost
all of my “elite” generals ended the war at the rank of lieutenant general
(even if temporary) and then served in the postwar army at that rank or
higher, even if they retired in the permanent rank of major general. As
for the service in the AEF, it might be tempting to exclude those who
held division, corps, army, and AEF senior staff positions, but the duties
of AEF staff officers certainly exposed them to danger and the pressures
of decision-making under fire within the context of limited time and
information. Would anyone argue that George C. Marshall did not see
combat in France, though he never held a field command?
I also took care to include officers as “elite” who served in the
four major theaters in the war with Japan. I have observed over time
senior officers of the Army who served in that war are overlooked in
accounting for service in World Wars I and II. I do not mean, of course,
Douglas MacArthur or Joseph Stilwell (both AEF veterans), but officers
like Stephen J. Chamberlin (USMA, 1912) who did not go to France
because he managed the Hoboken, New Jersey port-of-embarkation,
1917-1918, for which he received a Distinguished Service Medal (DSM).
Chamberlin served as the G-4, G-3, and Deputy C/S of the Southwest
Pacific Theater, 1942-1945 (Navy Cross, three DSMs), then commanded
the Fifth Army before his retirement as a lieutenant general in 1948. Yet
he is not mentioned in the same breath as Generals Walter Bedell Smith
(an AEF veteran) or Joseph T. McNarney (an AEF veteran).
My research to date has produced this set of statistics that correlates
overseas service in World War I with “elite” Army status in World War
II.
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Elite World War II Service

World War I Service Abroad

4

4

9

4

Zone of the Interior (U.S.)
United States Army Air
Forces
Mediterranean Theater
European Theater
War With Japan

11

9

30

23

13

11

In assigning generals to a theater, I have credited them to the theater
where their service confirmed their “elite” status (e.g. Eisenhower,
Bradley, Smith, and Patton to the ETO) or in case of division commanders who became corps commanders (e.g. Truscott, Ridgway) to the
theater where they assumed corps command.
At the end of the war in Europe, Eisenhower asked Bradley to
compile a list of ground officers whose performance proved they were
competent to command in the continuing war with Japan. Of the thirty
names Bradley sent to Ike, only nine had not served in the American
Expeditionary Forces, and four of these generals were too young and not
yet commissioned to serve in France. The only generals who might have
gone to France and did not were Collins, Eaker, Devers, and Ridgway.
Even though I will reevaluate what is an “elite” general and review
the nature of a general’s World War I service, the statistics above confirm
that World War I service abroad was the common experience of World
War II senior general officers, not the absence of such service as asserted
by Major Warren and many others. Just what effect that service had is
another question that counting and categorizing cannot answer.

The Author Replies
Jason W. Warren

I

am encouraged by the number of thoughtful and positive responses
that my article has inspired on Tom Ricks’ Best Defense blog and elsewhere, further identifying the lack of education and broadening for
Army leaders. The Army has recently initiated a number of programs to
produce better educated leaders, but the results are mixed. For instance,
a number of colonels at the War College with PhD’s or in PhD programs
have been identified for separation from the service with the ongoing
force reduction. This is counterproductive and makes little sense given
the renewed push to create better educated officers. Creating more officers with PhD’s is only one aspect of improving strategic development,
however. The industrial-aged personnel system still mindlessly moves
officers every three years regardless of individual talents, desires, or
potential (and creates unnecessary expenses in an era of limited budgets).
This hamstrings the broadening aspect of strategic development. Yet
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no senior leader has successfully taken on the personnel bureaucracy to
demand improvement.
Moreover, the Army has just cut deeply into its talent pool of combat
experienced officers (a 60 percent promotion rate to lieutenant colonel
this year, along with the continued separation of senior field grade officers), not only indicating the Army “value” of Loyalty is but a catchphrase,
but also hampering any headquarters’ ability to perform. This was a
self-inflicted wound; the Army’s leadership decided to break ranks with
those who sacrificed much during the Long War, to maintain a chimera
of more ready Brigade Combat Teams, whose readiness evaporates mere
months after combat center rotations, when not employed. Along with
reduced retirement and GI Bill benefits and stagnated income adjusted
for inflation, an officer retention and recruitment crisis is looming on
the not-so-distant horizon.
I also commend the esteemed military historian Allan Millett’s excellent analysis of “elite” US Army leaders’ combat experience in WWII.
We are in agreement many WWII Army officers had some overseas
experience and direct combat experience was not an indicator of future
successful strategic leadership. I argue this point throughout the article
and in the sentence immediately preceding the line Millett highlights:
“The cases of Ike, Bradley, and Fredendall indicate that combat experience and pre-war training may be desirable, but are unnecessary for adequate
performance.” The majority of “elite” Army leaders in 1943 did not have
direct WWI combat experience. I concur with Professor Millett: many
WWII generals had valuable service overseas and on the homefront
during WWI; however, today, these men would not be promoted to
general for failing to command in their respective maneuver branches
in combat. This is another obvious shortcoming of the current Army
personnel system.
Further, WWI on the Western Front was a classic linear campaign,
where, unlike contemporary wars, senior headquarters and training
facilities in the rear were far removed from enemy salvos and assassination attempts. There was really no appreciable difference in terms of
stationing in France away from the front, and say, Fort Dix, NJ, in the
United States. I referred to Walter Millis’ study from early 1943 which
determined only seven of 17 senior Army leaders had experienced direct
combat in the Great War. I have expanded Millis’ survey (including some
officers mentioned in Millett’s rejoinder) in the table below, examining
senior staff, theater, army, corps, and division commanders’ WWI direct
combat experience. I chose to examine the year 1943 because historians
widely acknowledge it as the turning point of the conflict against the
Axis powers, as Millett himself argues in his monumental A War to Be
Won: Fighting the Second World War, “The period between May 1942 and
July 1943 witnessed a major shift in the fortunes of war” (303). I focused
on ground combat as opposed to air combat in the Army Air Corps,
as my article is concerned with ground operations and today’s Army
leadership. A majority of the US Army’s senior leaders participating in
this shift of fortunes had no direct WWI ground combat experience,
and Professor Millet and I agree this did not negatively affect Allied
strategic outcomes in 1943.
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Key Staff Positions and
Combat Commands 1943

Yes Direct
WWI Combat
Experience

George Marshall
Thomas Handy
Lesley McNair
Albert Wedemeyer
Brehon Somervell
Lucius Clay
Frank Andrews
Jacob Devers
Dwight D. Eisenhower
Mark Clark
Douglas MacArthur
Robert Eichelberger
Walter Krueger
Stephen Chamberlain
Joseph Stillwell
Simon Buckner
Robert Richardson
John DeWitt
Walter Smith
Ben Lear
Alfred Greunther
Walter Muller
George Patton
Omar Bradley
Lloyd Fredendall
John Lucas
Geoffrey Keys
John Millikin
Leonard Gerow
Earnest Dawley
Gilbert Cook
Alvin Gillem
Oscar Griswold

War Dept
War Dept
War Dept
War Dept/CBO
War Dept
War Dept
ETO
ETO
North Africa
Italy
Southwest Pacific
Southwest Pacific
Southwest Pacific
Southwest Pacific
CBO
Alaska Defense
Hawaii Defense
Western Defense
North Africa
2nd Army
5th Army CoS
7th Army G4
I Armored Corps/7th Army
II Corps
II Corps
II Corps
II Corps
III Corps
V Corps
VI Corps
XII Corps
XIII Corps
XIV Corps

Yes
Yes
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No Direct WWI
Combat Experience;
*AEF/Corps Staff
Planner;
**Rear Training/
School Duty France;
***Siberian
Expedition

No*
No
Yes
No
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
No***
Yes
No
No*
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
No
No**
Yes
No
No**
No**
No*
Yes
No***
No
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Alexander Patch
Wade Haislip
Frank Milburn
John Hodge
James Gavin
Terry Allen
Lucian Truscott
Charles Corlett
Manton Eddy
J. Lawton Collins
William Gill
Charles Ryder
Robert Beightler
Horace Fuller
John Hester
Matthew Ridgway
John Hodge
Totals

XIV Corps
XV Corps
XXI Corps
XXIV Corps
ADC 82nd
1st Div
3rd Div
7th Div
9th Div
25th Div
32nd Div
34th Div
37th Div
41st Div
43rd Div
82nd Div
Americal Div

Yes
No*
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
No*
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
Counted above
21
28

Sources: Shelby L. Stanton, Order of Battle: US Army, World War II (Novato, CA:
Presidio Press, 1984); Robert H. Berlin, US Army World War II Corps Commanders – A
Composite Biography (Leavenworth, KA: US Army Command and General Staff
College, 1989); Ed Cray, General of the Army: George C. Marshall, Soldier and Statesman
(New York: Cooper Square Press, 2000); Mark T. Calhoun, General Lesley J. McNair:
Unsung Architect of the US Army (Lawrence, KA: University Press of Kansas, 2015);
other biographies.

